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Introduction
By exploiting the power of a market to allocate pollution control responsibilities, welldesigned emissions trading programs promise to achieve environmental quality goals more cheaply than traditional command-and-control regulations. It is obvious though that the full potential of emissions trading cannot materialize if these programs are not enforced well. In recognition of this fact, a sizable theoretical literature exists that examines the consequences of noncompliance and the design of enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs. There is, however, a significant omission in this literature-there is no published work that examines what the level of noncompliance should be for emissions trading programs. To fill this gap, this paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target costeffectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target?
Authors of papers in literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading policies often assume that enforcement is not, or cannot be sufficient to induce full compliance [Malik (1990 [Malik ( , 2002 , Keeler (1991) , van Egteren and Weber (1996) , Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) , Montero (2002) ]. Others restrict their analyses to full-compliance outcomes [Malik (1992) , Stranlund and Chavez (2000) , Chavez and Stranlund (2003) ]. In practice we find examples of emissions trading programs with significant noncompliance as well as examples with nearperfect compliance. Montero, Sanchez, and Katz (2002) argue that the development of an emissions trading program for total suspended particulates in Santiago, Chile has been hampered by weak enforcement and significant noncompliance. On the other hand, several EPA emissions trading programs like the SO 2 Allowance Trading and the NO X Budget Trading programs were clearly designed to achieve very high rates of compliance and have been successful in achieving this goal [US EPA 2004a , 2004b .
The model of this paper assumes that a regulator chooses a supply of emissions permits and monitoring to check individual firms for noncompliance to minimize the expected costs of inducing a fixed aggregate emissions target. Given a penalty schedule for emissions in excess of permit holdings, the supply of permits and the distribution of monitoring determine individual violation levels. The expected costs of an emissions trading program include not only the firms' aggregate abatement costs and the government's monitoring costs, but also the expected costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms. The expected costs of sanctioning violations have been ignored in the literature on enforcing emissions trading policies. Not only is the assumption that penalizing firms is costly a realistic one, it is also an important determinant of the results of this paper.
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Unlike much of the literature on optimal law enforcement (see Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a review), this work is not concerned with choosing optimal penalty 'levels', mainly to avoid focusing attention on the common, but not entirely informative result that penalties should be set as high as possible. Instead the analysis focuses on the choice of penalty structure; that is, we will examine the relative merits of employing an increasing marginal penalty or a constant marginal penalty. 1 The policy objective of minimizing the costs of achieving an arbitrary environmental target has always been an important objective for analysts and policy makers alike. Montgomery's (1972) seminal work on the efficiency of competitive emissions trading takes this approach. The result that competitive emissions trading minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of reaching an aggregate emissions target is perhaps the main justification for proposing and implementing emissions markets. This paper extends the long line of inquiry into the costeffective design of environmental policies by including the costs of enforcement in the policy objective.
Under common assumptions in the literature on compliance under emissions trading resources are certainly a factor in many real instances of environmental policy enforcement, the main result of this paper suggests that in designing an emissions trading program to achieve an aggregate emissions target, regulators should allocate sufficient enforcement resources to achieve full compliance.
Another common assumption that is used to preclude full compliance outcomes is that penalties are restricted to be no more than some maximum level. For example, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) motivate their review of the literature on the economics of law enforcement with a standard model that assumes that the penalty for a violation is less than the benefit that some in 2 There is no work in the literature that compares the efficiency properties of alternative penalty schedules for emissions trading policies. Keeler (1991) provides a positive comparison of emissions trading to emissions standards under exogenous enforcement strategies that involve increasing, constant, and decreasing marginal penalties. In contrast, this paper is concerned with deriving endogenous enforcement strategies and the determination of whether marginal penalties should be increasing or constant. Decreasing marginal penalties are not considered in this paper.
3 Garvie and Keeler (1994) assume this objective in their analysis of enforcing emissions standards, and MachoStadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005) assume the same in their analysis of enforcing emissions taxes.
a population receive from a violation. Obviously, with this assumption full compliance is not possible. Although no upper bound is placed on penalties in this paper, the cost-effectiveness of full compliance and a constant marginal penalty does not depend on the freedom to choose an arbitrarily high marginal penalty. All that is required to make sure that full compliance is a regulatory option is that marginal penalties exceed the prevailing price for emissions permits.
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The cost-effectiveness of a constant marginal penalty may also be surprising to some, given that such a penalty is not common in the literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs. Interestingly, constant marginal penalties appear to be much more common for actual and proposed emissions trading programs than in the literature.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. the marginal penalty to the prevailing permit price allows the regulator to meet its environmental target cost-effectively without any information about the firms' abatement costs. However, dealing with uncertain abatement costs when the policy goal is to choose the optimal environmental target is not as straightforward. Section 6 concludes.
Individual Choices under an Increasing Marginal Penalty
The analysis of this paper is based on a standard model of compliance in emissions trading programs. 6 Throughout consider a fixed set of n heterogeneous, risk-neutral firms. 
γ > When the analysis turns to a constant marginal penalty schedule in section 4, γ will be set to zero.
Assume that the intercept of the marginal penalty schedule, φ , is greater than the equilibrium price of permits. This assumption allows full compliance to be a possible outcome throughout the paper. No upper bound on marginal penalties is imposed, but none of the results of this paper rely on setting arbitrarily high penalties.
Assuming throughout that each firm chooses positive emissions, firm i's objective is
e l l π φ γ
Restricting the firm to follows from the fact that a firm will never have an incentive to be over-compliant. 
Because the constraint is linear and the firm's objective is strictly convex when the penalty function is strictly convex, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to identify unique optimal choices of emissions, permit demand, and violation level. yields which uniquely determines the firm's choice of emissions. Note that this decision rule is independent of the enforcement strategy the firm faces, and thus holds whether the marginal penalty is increasing or constant. Since each firm chooses its emissions so that its marginal abatement cost is equal to the going permit price, the permit market will equalize firms' marginal abatement costs. Consequently, whatever level of aggregate emissions results in equilibrium, the aggregate abatement costs of reaching that level of emissions are minimized.
Furthermore, in equilibrium the permit price is equal to the aggregate marginal abatement cost function at the resulting level of aggregate emissions. These results are contained in the following lemma. Since the results are well known, the lemma is offered without proof. Note that the lemma holds regardless of whether the marginal penalty is increasing or constant. 
where E is aggregate emissions and
Lemma 1 is an important result, for the analysis of emissions trading programs generally, and for this work in particular. That a competitive permit market leads to a distribution of emissions that minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of reaching an aggregate emissions target has always been one of the main reasons for proposing market-based policies to control pollution.
For this work, as long as Lemma 1 holds and an aggregate emissions standard is achieved, alternative policies all have the same minimized aggregate abatement costs. This allows the regulatory choice of noncompliance to be focused solely on minimizing the expected enforcement costs of inducing the aggregate standard.
Apart from the assumption of competitive permit trading, two assumptions guarantee that Lemma 1 holds throughout this work. 9 The first is that each firm holds a positive number of permits. Using [2] and [3] it is straightforward to show that a firm that holds no permits chooses its emissions so that ( ).
If this inequality is strict for some firms, then the marginal abatement costs of the firms will not be equalized and aggregate abatement costs will not be minimized. In section 4, I briefly discuss the possibility that a policy may require that some firms hold zero permits, but that possibility appears rather remote. One may also wonder whether a real firm would ever hold zero permits, given that this would send such an obvious signal of noncompliance to the regulator.
The other assumption that is necessary for Lemma 1 to hold is that firms do not have subjective evaluations of their detection probabilities that depend on their emissions choices and permit holdings. Malik (1990) has shown that if a noncompliant firm's subjective probability of detection is ( , )
∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ≠ , then it chooses its emissions so that its marginal abatement cost differs from the permit price. If this is the case, then it is unlikely that the firms' marginal abatement costs will be equal and that aggregate abatement costs will be minimized. This is the reason that the objective detection probabilities, as determined by the government's monitoring efforts, are assumed to be common knowledge in this paper. The lemma will not hold in the presence of market power or transaction costs. See van Egteren and Weber (1996) , Malik (2002) , and Chavez and Stranlund (2003) for analyses of compliance and enforcement of emissions trading programs in the presence of market power. Chavez and Stranlund (2004) analyze compliance and enforcement in the presence of transaction costs.
straightforward to show that a firm's violation choice is ( ) Note that a firm's violation choice depends only the permit price and the enforcement variables, not on its abatement costs. For this reason, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) have argued that a budget-constrained regulator that seeks to minimize the aggregate violations of heterogeneous risk neutral firms cannot use differences in the firms' abatement costs to target its monitoring effort. The reason is that each firm's emissions and violation decisions are keyed to the permit price so that, at the margin, there are no differences among them that an enforcer can exploit. 10 This result also plays an important role in the determination of the cost-effective levels of noncompliance in emissions trading programs.
The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance with an Increasing Marginal Penalty
We are now ready to characterize a cost-effective emission trading policy that is enforced with a linearly increasing marginal penalty. The regulatory objective is to minimize the sum of aggregate abatement costs, aggregate monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms, while holding aggregate emissions to a pre-specified target E . The instruments available to the regulator are detection probabilities
and the aggregate supply of permits L.
As noted in the previous section, Lemma 1 simplifies the regulator's problem. To make sure that aggregate emissions are equal to the target the regulator must induce the fixed permit price
. Competitive permit trading minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of holding aggregate emissions to E , so the regulator only needs to minimize the expected enforcement costs of achieving the emissions target. Rather than choosing individual detection probabilities and the supply of permits, it is analytically more convenient to choose individual violation levels,
The violation levels then determine the detection probabilities , 1, , . ( , , ) ( ) .
It is clear that aggregate monitoring costs are monotonically decreasing in a firm's violation.
This is due to the fact that allowing a higher violation by a firm is accomplished by monitoring it less closely.
In the literature on the economics of law enforcement it is usually assumed that penalties are imposed without cost. 11 In this case, however, because monitoring costs are decreasing in the firms' violations, assuming costless sanctions would lead us to conclude that a cost-effective emissions trading policy would involve maximum violations. This literally suggests setting the aggregate supply of permits equal to zero and eliminating the permit market altogether. Then, each firm would face a zero emissions standard and an expected penalty for each unit of pollution it releases. 12 In reality, however, penalizing firms is likely to be costly. Sanctioning costs will certainly include the administrative costs associated with imposing and collecting penalties. These costs could also include the potentially more substantial costs of government investigations to generate enough evidence to convince a court of a firm's liability, as well as the social costs of firms' efforts to challenge or avoid the imposition of penalties.
Let β be the per-dollar cost of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Since the expected penalty for firm i is expected aggregate sanctioning costs are
.
Allowing individual violations to increase produces countervailing effects on expected sanctioning costs. Holding a firm's detection probability constant, obviously expected sanctioning costs would increase if it chooses a higher violation. However, allowing a firm's violation to increase is accomplished by reducing the detection probability, which implies a decrease in expected sanctioning costs. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the former effect dominates the latter so that expected sanctioning costs are increasing in individual violations.
Since aggregate monitoring costs are decreasing in individual violations, the regulatory choice of noncompliance balances reduced monitoring costs against increased expected sanctioning costs.
13
13 Simple forms for monitoring costs and the expected costs of sanctioning firms are used to ease the analysis and to highlight the essential aspects of the regulator's choice of noncompliance. These cost functions can be generalized substantially without affecting the main results of this paper. All that is required is that monitoring costs are decreasing and expected sanctioning costs are increasing in individual violations, the sum of the two costs are strictly convex, and if any two firms have the same violation, then their marginal monitoring costs are equal as are their marginal expected sanctioning costs.
Let TE denote total expected enforcement costs. Since Lemma 1 guarantees that the permit market will minimize aggregate abatement costs, the cost-effective distribution of violations is the solution to:
subject to 0, 1, 2,..., .
Note that no upper bound on individual violations is specified. This is because we have already precluded the possibility that it might be optimal to choose an individual violation level such that a firm holds no permits. Given this assumption, possible solutions to the regulator's problem are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given a linearly increasing marginal penalty and the regulatory objective of minimizing the sum of the firms' abatement costs and the expected enforcement costs of holding aggregate emissions to an exogenous standard E : The possibility that the marginal costs of monitoring may differ among firms is related to the idea that the government may be able to detect the violations of some individuals more easily than others. Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) were the first to examine heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension in the determination of optimal law enforcement. A recent paper by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005) assume heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension in their study of enforcing emissions taxes.
simply a matter of minimizing the expected enforcement costs of achieving the emissions target.
To guarantee that aggregate emissions are equal to the target E , the regulator must induce the fixed permit price ( )
Equation [ that is, the cost-effective level of noncompliance is zero.
The cost-effectiveness of full compliance under a constant marginal penalty depends on the assumption that all firms hold a positive number of permits. While this assumption is maintained throughout this work, it is worthwhile to briefly consider, at least qualitatively, whether the full compliance equilibrium can be improved upon by a policy that is designed so that a subset of firms hold zero permits, and hence, are fully noncompliant. Start with a full compliance equilibrium and imagine reducing the monitoring of a subset of firms. These firms will sell off all of their permits because the permit price exceeds the expected marginal penalty they face.
Moreover, they will increase their emissions, because the expected marginal penalty is lower.
Holding aggregate emissions to the target, therefore, requires that the emissions of the other firms must fall. To accomplish this the supply of permits is reduced to just cover the emissions of these firms and they are monitored so that they are fully compliant. Since these firms choose lower emissions than under the original equilibrium, the permit price must rise. Note that allowing noncompliance by a subset of firms has two countervailing effects on monitoring costs.
Monitoring effort is reduced for the noncompliant firms, but monitoring must increase for the compliant firms because the permit price is higher.
There are two other costs associated with moving from a full compliance outcome. First, aggregate abatement costs will be higher, because individual firms' marginal abatement costs are no longer equal; the marginal abatement costs of firms that hold permits are higher than for those who do not. Second, expected sanctioning costs increase from zero because some of the firms are now noncompliant.
Clearly, if it is possible to improve on the full compliance equilibrium then the reduction in monitoring costs for the noncompliant firms must be larger than the increase in the monitoring costs of those firms that remain compliant, and the net reduction in monitoring costs must outweigh the increase in aggregate abatement costs and the expected costs of sanctioning the noncompliant firms. While this may be possible, it is probably so only under very limited circumstances. A rigorous derivation of the conditions under which it is possible to improve on the full compliance outcome with a policy that is designed so that some firms hold zero permits may be a worthwhile topic for future research.
Under the assumption that all firms hold a positive number of permits, Propositions 1 and 2 together suggests that the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs depends to a large degree on whether an increasing or constant marginal penalty is employed. In particular, a positive amount of noncompliance is only cost-effective if violations are punished with an increasing marginal penalty. Thus, the regulatory choice of noncompliance rests on a comparison of the costs of a policy with an increasing marginal penalty that allows for some noncompliance and a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty.
To conduct this comparison consider a policy with a given increasing marginal penalty function ( ) There are other policies with constant marginal penalties that do not exceed the equilibrium marginal penalty of this policy that induce full compliance and achieve the emissions target with lower expected costs.
The policy significance of Propositions 2 and 3 is quite strong-there appears to be little justification for designing an emissions trading policy that allows a positive amount of noncompliance to the policy. Under the assumptions maintained throughout this work, the costeffective design of an emissions trading program should involve a constant marginal penalty that exceeds the expected equilibrium permit price by as much as is practicable; the supply of permits should be equal to the aggregate emissions target, and monitoring should be sufficient to induce full compliance.
Further Discussion: Uncertain Abatement Costs
There is a difficulty with designing an emissions trading policy to satisfy an aggregate emissions standard when there is the potential for noncompliance that has not been addressed in this paper, but that is easily remedied. To make sure that the firms' aggregate emissions meet the aggregate standard, the expected marginal penalty must be equal to the aggregate marginal abatement cost function evaluated at the standard. In the case of a constant marginal penalty, this With monitoring in this way and a supply of permits L = E , the emissions target will be reached at least cost without any information about firms' abatement costs. This approach works because the marginal penalty adjusts to aggregate marginal abatement costs through the equilibrium permit price.
The ability to achieve an emissions target cost-effectively without knowledge of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function gives emissions trading programs an advantage over emissions standards and taxes when enforcement is costly and imperfect. Of course, an emissions tax will minimize aggregate abatement costs, and enforcement of the tax can be structured to eliminate sanctioning costs. However, to hold aggregate emissions to a fixed standard, the tax and the expected marginal penalty must be equal to the aggregate marginal abatement cost function at the standard, which requires complete information about abatement
costs. An emissions trading policy can overcome this problem by tying the marginal penalty to the permit price.
Sandmo (2002) While it is straightforward to deal with uncertainty about abatement costs if the policy goal is to achieve an aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, it is not so easy to deal with uncertain abatement costs if emissions target itself is to be chosen optimally. In fact the fundamental results of this paper may not hold with that policy objective.
With complete information about abatement costs, a cost-effective policy of full compliance and a constant marginal penalty can easily be incorporated into the choice of the optimal emissions target. Suppose that emissions are uniformly mixed and cause damage that is characterized by an increasing and convex damage function D(E). The first-best environmental target is chosen to equate marginal damage to aggregate marginal abatement costs. With the necessity of enforcing an emissions trading program, however, the efficient environmental target is no longer first-best. Suppose that a constant marginal penalty is employed. Proposition 2 then implies that whatever level of aggregate emissions is chosen, it will be optimal to issue that number of permits and monitor firms to guarantee full compliance. The detection probability is , the efficient level of emissions is greater than the first-best level. Moreover, the price of emissions,
is less than the Pigouvian price. Less control than first best is efficient, because the optimal choice of aggregate emissions internalizes the enforcement costs of maintaining this level of emissions.
Clearly, complete information about abatement costs is required to determine the optimal level of aggregate emissions. Because of this the main result of this paper about the optimality of full compliance and a constant marginal penalty may not hold: optimality may actually call for allowing noncompliance and employing an increasing marginal penalty. Roberts and Spence (1976) have proposed a modification of an emissions trading program to include a "safety valve"
tax. This tax reduces the welfare loss of a permit-trading program when aggregate marginal abatement costs are underestimated, because it allows firms to pay a price to partially escape the burden of unexpectedly high abatement costs. The expected marginal penalty could be constructed to serve this purpose, and could be chosen to allow noncompliance if marginal abatement costs turn out to be higher than expected. Furthermore, an increasing marginal penalty schedule may be preferred to a constant marginal penalty. The main benefit of Roberts and Spence's mixed permit/tax policy is that it can be constructed to approximate the marginal damage schedule. If marginal damages are increasing, then an increasing expected marginal penalty could approximate it more closely than a constant expected marginal penalty.
Montero (2002) has provided an interesting paper that links the insights of Roberts and
Spence to imperfect compliance. He reexamined Weitzman's (1974) comparison of price (emissions tax) and quantity instruments (tradable permits) under uncertainty and imperfect compliance, and found that the potential advantage of an emissions tax over a transferable permit system is significantly reduced by incomplete enforcement. The main reason is that under incomplete enforcement, a transferable permit system resembles the mixed transferable permit/tax scheme of Roberts and Spence. However, Montero assumes at the outset of his analysis that full compliance is never optimal, which, of course, runs contrary to the results of this paper. A potentially fruitful investigation for the future would reconsider the results of this paper when there is incomplete information about abatement costs, and then use the results to reexamine the prices versus quantity debate.
Conclusion
This paper has addressed a fundamental environmental policy question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? Using a conventional model of emissions trading with common assumptions, I have argued that allowing noncompliance is only cost-effective if violations are punished with an increasing marginal penalty, but that any such policy is more costly than one that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty. The results of this work suggest a strong recommendation for designing emissions trading programs to meet a pre-determined environmental standard: the supply of permits should be equal to the aggregate emissions target, violations should be punished with a constant marginal penalty that exceeds the equilibrium permit price by as much as is practicable, and monitoring should be sufficient to induce full compliance. In addition, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the regulator to achieve the aggregate emissions standard without any knowledge of the firms' abatement costs.
While the results of this paper are quite strong, they should be accompanied by certain caveats that deserve further attention. Several of these have been mentioned at various places in the paper, like the causes and consequences of monitoring and sanctioning costs that may vary across firms, the possibility that a cost-effective policy could call for a design in which some firms hold no permits, and the optimal choice of an environmental target when abatement costs are uncertain. Let me add just a few more. Reconsidering the results of this work when permit trading is imperfect because of market power or transaction costs may be a fruitful exercise.
Furthermore, like most analysts, we've assumed that monitoring produces a perfect measure of emissions to determine its compliance status. However, in many situations in which emissions trading might be applied, monitoring errors are possible. Moreover, in many situations emissions cannot be measured directly and must be inferred from observable data on a firm's operations.
